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Comments
THE DISC LEGISLATION AS A VIOLATION OF
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE
I. INTRODUCTION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' was established in 1946
with the avowed purpose of promoting international trade through the
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers and other governmental dis-
tortions of the free flow of goods and services. Its creation is usually at-
tributed to the United States, as "a product of U.S. planning and a reflec-
tion of certain views that dominated the thinking on trade matters of
U.S. diplomats in the 1940s."2 Because of this initiative, it is argued, the
United States should be particularly sensitive to charges that it has vio-
lated the terms or the spirit of GATT.3
The enactment in 1971 of legislation authorizing the Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation [DISC]4 has evoked just such criticism. The tax
deferral treatment of DISCs is attacked as an export subsidy, which is both
expressly prohibited by GATT and inconsistent with its policy goals.
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate that charge in light of the
specific language and the underlying policies of GATT and DISC.
II. GATT AND ITS PURPOSE
A. In General
The worldwide depression of the 1930's served to disrupt the network of
international trade and finance which had developed during the 1920's.5
This depression played a significant role in the instigation of programs
geared to national self-sufficiency and economic independence which were
considered to be the earmarks of the trend toward economic nationalism
and the fettering of free international trade.0 Following World War II,
1. IV GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE [hereinafter cited as
GATT] BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS: [hereinafter cited as BISD]
1 (1969).
2. K. DAM, THE GATT-LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as DAM].
3. Although GATT has never been submitted to the Senate for its approval,
it is generally agreed that the General Agreement constitutes a valid executive
agreement entered into pursuant to existing legislation. For a thorough discussion
of the status of GATT as domestic law, see Jackson, The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade in the United States Domestic Law, 66 MICu. L. REv. 249 (1967).
4. 85 Stat. 497. Title V thereof added sections 991-97 to the INT. REV. CODE
-oF 1954.
5. N. PALMER AND H. PERKINS, INTERNATIONAL RELAIONs 533 (3d ed. 1969).
6. Id.
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the United States took the lead in drawing together the countries of the
world and influencing them to take positive steps toward the reduction of
barriers to world trade.7 The most significant product of this combined
endeavor was the instrument negotiated at the Geneva discussions in 1947
entitled "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."3 This multi-
lateral international agreement is today the principal method of regulation
of world trade.9
B. Treatment of Subsidies
Because it is designed to reduce governmental barriers to international
trade, "[t]he General Agreement is hostile to subsidies."' 0 The underly-
ing principle of Article XVI of the General Agreement expresses the view
that all subsidies are "undesirable interferences with the free flow of
goods."' L Theorists aver that subsidies divert international trade from its
normal pattern and distort the structure of production from that deter-
mined by comparative costs.' 2
Notwithstanding the contracting parties' 3 apparent disfavor of sub-
sidies, the General Agreement does not reflect a single determined ap-
proach of condemnation. The failure of the parties to agree upon such
an approach probably stems both from the complexity of the problem and
from a lingering attachment to those economic protectionist programs of
which special interest groups have become so fond.' 4
The General Agreement, in its treatment of subsidies, distinguishes
between "production subsidies" and "export subsidies." The general aim
of a production subsidy is to protect domestic producers from the import
of foreign goods. It enables the domestic producer to sell at a price
lower than a foreign producer can afford to sell his imported product,
thereby frustrating competition. Examples of this form of subsidization in-
clude payment of certain amounts for each item produced, tax exemptions
or remissions based on each item produced, and favorable loans for capital
improvement.
An export subsidy, on the other hand, is designed specifically to pro-
mote exports. It bestows a competitive advantage upon domestic producers
by enabling them to ship goods abroad to be sold at a price below the
7. Id. at 535.
8. Id. at 538; DAi, supra note 2, at 11.
9. Jackson, supra note 3, at 250.
10. DAm, supra note 2, at 132.
11. DAM, supra note 2, at 134; Anninger, DISC and GATT: International
Trade Aspects of Bringing Deferral Home, 13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 391, 392-93 (1972).
12. See, e.g., G. HABERLER, THE THEoaY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 321-22(1936); R. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as BALDWIN].
13. When used in all capitals, this term refers to the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES acting jointly under authorization of GATT, Article XXV, paragraph 1,
or other clauses of GATT. Otherwise, "contracting parties" refers to members of
GATT individually.
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foreign market price. This form of subsidization differs from a production
subsidy in that it is conferred only upon those products which are ex-
ported. Hence, the same methods of implementation may be utilized.
1. Production Subsidies
Production subsidies are treated less harshly by the General Agree-
ment than are export subsidies.15 Article XVI, Section A, which embodies a
"notification-consultation" requirement, is the only provision applicable
to production subsidies. Under this provision, if contracting parties main-
tain subsidies that operate "directly or indirectly to increase exports or ...
reduce imports," they are to notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of
such subsidies. Furthermore, where it is determined that serious prejudice
to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened, a
duty arises to "discuss" the "possibility of limiting the subsidization."' 0
Although this provision seems rather innocuous, it is generally agreed
that "nations exhibit considerable sensitivity to such a reporting require-
ment, perhaps because notification of subsidies can focus attention on them
and excite other GATT members to utilize their remedies in GATT."17
Moreover, "the consultation requirement may be an aid in making con-
tracting parties aware of the harsh effects of their subsidies on other na-
tions and, when viewed in the light of various other remedies available
under GATT, could be meaningful."' 8
2. Export Subsidies
Until 1955, Article XVI, Section A was the only provision which spoke
15. The difference in treatment of import and export hindrances to trade
is part of a notion evident throughout the General Agreement that a
country has a greater right to interfere with its own domestic markets than
with markets of other countries. Artificially reducing imports by tariffs or
domestic subsidies is regarded as more acceptable than artificially increas-
ing exports by means of export subsidies, domestic subsidies, or dumping.
R. BALDWIN, supra note 12, at 47. Even so, "both sets of measures have significant
economic effects on both foreign and domestic markets." Id. at n.44. See also, DAM,
supra note 2, at 134; JACKSON, supra note 14, at 365-66.
16. Article XVI(A)(1) provides:
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including
any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly
to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any
product into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the
estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected prod.
uct or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the
circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which
it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other con-
tracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the con-
tracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the
other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACT-
ING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.
17. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 388.
18. Id. at 392.
[Vol. 41
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to the subsidy issue.' 9 At the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties in
1955, this article was amended by the addition of Section B dealing with
export subsidization. 20 Therefore, in addition to the "notification-consul-
tation" requirement imposed by Section A, an export subsidy may now be
subject to the more stringent requirements of Section B, paragraphs (3)
or (4). To determine which paragraph applies, one must look to the type
of product which the subsidy supports.
a. Primary Products
Paragraph (3) of Article XVI addresses itself only to those "subsidies
on the export of primary products."'1 A primary product is defined as
"any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral in its natural form
or which has undergone such process as is customarily required to prepare
it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade."22 The dis-
tinction between primary and nonprimary products stems from the desire
of many governments to "insulate their farmers from the vicissitudes of
world market prices by subsidies or by measures that are analytically
19. DAm, supra note 2, at 141-42.
20. GATT, 3d Supp. BISD 222, 224-27 (1955); PROTOCOL AMENDING THE PRE-
AMBLE AND PARTS II AND III OF THE GATT 1955). Section B provides in full:
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contract-
ing party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful
effects for other contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may
cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may
hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
8. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of
subsidies on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting
party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to
increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such sub-
sidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting
party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that
product, account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties
in such trade in the product during a previous representative period,
and any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such
trade in the product.
4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date
thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indi-
rectly any form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a pri-
mary product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for export
at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product
to buyers in the domestic market. Until 13 December 1957 no contracting
party shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that exist-
ing on I January 1955 by the introduction of new, or the extension of ex-
isting, subsidies.
5. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the operation of
the provisions of the Article from time to time with a view to examin-
ing its effectiveness, in light of actual experience, in promoting the ob-
jectives of the Agreement and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial
to the trade or interests of contracting parties.
21. Id.
22. GATT, Annex I, Ad. Art. XVI, sec. B(2).
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similar to subsidies."23 Thus, paragraph (3) was structured to allow such
subsidization without condoning the same.
Paragraph (3) first instructs that the contracting parties should seek
to avoid primary product subsidization.24 If such a subsidy is employed,
however, it "shall not be applied in a manner which results in that con-
tracting party having more than an equitable share of world export trade
in that product . ,,25 As one may easily detect, the insertion of the term
"equitable share" has presented definitional problems which have led to
nonobservance of the prohibition.2 6
b. Nonprimary Products
Paragraph (4) of Article XVI, which deals with the export of non-
primary products, presents a more determined attempt to eliminate sub-
sidies as trade barriers than does paragraph (3).27 It states:
[C]ontracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or in-
directly any form of subsidy on the export of any product other
than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market.28
This prohibition on the introduction of new export subsidies is immediately
followed by what is called the "standstill" obligation.2 0 At the time of en-
actment it represented an agreement to work toward the elimination of
then existing export subsidies,3 0 but, contrary to its terms, no agreement
on the prohibition of all such subsidization was reached by December
1957. Thus, the "deadline" was extended' until 1960 when the Seventh
Session of the Contracting Parties arrived at The Declaration Giving Effect
23. DAu,, supra note 2, at 134.
24. See note 20 supra.
25. Id.
26. DAm, supra note 2, at 142-43.
27. However, it is of limited applicability as it is binding only on those few
developed nations which have accepted The Declaration Giving Effect to the Pro.
visions of Article XVI, Paragraph 4, done at Geneva, on Nov. 19, 1960, GATT,
9th Supp. BISD 32 (1961). Accepted by the United States on Sept. 19, 1961,
Proc. No. 3515, 3 C.F.R. 246 (1959-1963 Comp.), 445 U.N.T.S. 294, 303 (1962).
28. See note 20 supra.
29. Id.
30. Interpretive Note, Ad. Art. XVI, para. 4, GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 32
(1961).
31. Declaration Extending the Standstill Provisions of Article XVI: 4 of the
GATT, 1957; GATT, 6th Supp. BISD 24 (1958); Proces-'erbal Extending the
Validity of the Declaration Extending the Standstill Provisions of Article XVI:/
of the GATT, 1958; GATT, 7th Supp. BISD 30 (1959); Proces-Verbal Further Ex-
tending the Validity of the Declaration Extending the Standstill Provisions of
Article XVI:4 of the GATT, 1959; GATT, 8th Supp. BISD 25 (1960). This series
of extensions is indicative of the difficulty which accompanies an attempt to
pierce protective economic trade barriers.
[Vol. 41
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to the Provisions of Article XVI, Paragraph 4,32 which became effective
November 14, 1962.3
3. Summary
The net effect of Article XVI of the General Agreement, then, can be
summed up in the following manner: (1) production subsidy-no con-
straint except to report and consult; (2) export subsidy: primary product-
slight constraint (not to use subsidies to get more than an equitable share
of the market); and (3) export subsidy: nonprimary product-constraint for
a small group of developed countries only.34
III. DISC AND ITS PURPOSE
A. The Purpose of DISC
Prior to 1972, domestic corporations were generally subject to tax
on all income on a current basis, even if derived from foreign trade or
export, whereas foreign corporations were generally free from United States
tax on foreign-source income, even if owned by an American company,
until such profits were distributed to the domestic parent.3 5 This tax struc-
ture supposedly contributed to the United States' balance of payments
deficit by encouraging American corporations to establish manufacturing
subsidiaries in foreign countries.3 6 Congress therefore enacted the DISC
provisions as part of the Revenue Act of 1971 in order to curb the mounting
trade deficits, as well as to increase domestic employment. 37 This twofold
objective, it was reasoned, would be attained by inducing domestic com-
panies to establish non-domestic markets for their products and to supply
these markets with products manufactured in domestic factories.3 8 This
inducement has taken the form of a tax incentive as effected through the
DISC deferral system.
In theory, the desired increase in American exports should be the
result of three interacting factors. First, a tax deferral gives the exporters
the opportunity to lower prices39 or to increase the demand for exports
32. See note 27 supra.
33. For a discussion on the topic of which countries are bound by Art. XIV(4),
see JACKSON, supra note 14, at 374-76.
34. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 877. See also note 27 supra.
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64.
86. Anninger, supra note 11, at 891; S. REP. No. 92-487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. 8: AD. NEWS 1918, 1996 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
S. RE . No. 92-487 followed by the appropriate page of the U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws].
37. S. REP. No. 92-437 at 1928, 1996; H.R. Rm. No. 92-538, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1825, 1882 (1971). Previous at-
tempts to improve the international economic position of the United States by
means of the tax system include: (1) the Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation
provisions, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 921-22; (2) the Subpart F provisions, INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64, 972-92; and (3) the Interest Equalization Tax, INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4911-81.
38. Comment, DISC: A Tax Primer, 20 Loor.A L. R.Ev. 825 (1973-1974).
89. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Fi-
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by expending more funds on export promotion. 40 Second, increasing the
profitability of exporting will, according to economic theory, cause a shift
of firms and their resources to the exporting industry, which in turn should
result in a higher number of exports. 41 Third, by making it just as profit-
able to have a manufacturing subsidiary based within the United States,
the trend toward establishing manufacturing subsidiaries in foreign coun-
tries should be slowed down considerably. 42 Accordingly, the demand for
the product, formerly satisfied by the foreign subsidiary, would have to be
satisfied by the domestic company.
B. Statutory Qualifications
A DISC is a domestic corporation and tax entity whose business is ex-
porting. If the corporation (usually a shell corporation and a subsidiary of
a domestic manufacturer) satisfies the five statutory requirements, then it
qualifies as a DISC and as such may enjoy several tax benefits. These re-
quirements are:
(1) The corporation must be one which is incorporated under the
laws of any of the states or the District of Columbia. 43
(2) The corporation must have only one class of stock, 44 and the par
or stated value of its outstanding stock must always be maintained at 2,500
or above.4 5 Also, a DISC must keep separate books and records and main-
tain its own bank account.46
A more simple and less expensive accounting device for determining
export profits could have been created, but the separate incorporation
method relieves the Internal Revenue Service from having to trace the al-
located income and investment uses through the books of an integrated
firm.47
(3) At least 95 percent of the gross receipts of the corporation must con-
sist of qualified export receipts. 48 "Gross receipts" are defined as the
total receipts from the sale, lease, or rental of property held primarily for
nance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1971) (Testimony of Sec. of the Treasury, John
Connally).
40. Considine, The DISC Legislation: An Evaluation, 7 J. INT'L LAW & POL.
217, 218 (1974).
41. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT's TAsK F O.CE ON BusINEss TAxATION 44 (1970).
42. Hearings on the Trade Act of 1970 Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 535 (1970) (Testimony of Undersecretary of the
Treasury, Paul Volcker).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 992(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1(a) (1) (1974).
44. This requirement obviates the need for special allocation rules for earn-
ings distributions to different classes of shareholders.
45. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 992(a)(1)(C). As to the treatment of debt pay-
able to shareholders, see Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1 (d) (2) (1974).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1(a)(6), (7) (1974).
47. Considine, supra note 40, at 223; S. REP. No. 92437 at 1999.
48. INT. R.EV. CODE OF 1954, § 992(a)(1)(A). See Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1
(a)(2), (b) (1974). For a detailed discussion, see Roberts, DISC: Qualified Export
Receipts Under the Proposed Regulations, DIGEST OF TAX ARTICLES 42 (April
1975).
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sale, lease, or rental in the ordinary course of trade or business, and gross
income from all other sources.4 9 The definition of "qualified export re-
ceipts" includes several items, the most significant of which are: gross re-
ceipts from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of export property;50
gross receipts for services which are related and subsidiary to any quali-
fied sale, exchange, lease, rental, or other disposition of export property
by such corporation;G1 and interest on any obligation which is a qualified
export asset-e.g., a producer's loan.52
This requirement is apparently designed to ensure that the DISC will
engage in the exporting business and not be used as a shelter for non-
qualified domestic sales. 53
(4) The adjusted basis of the qualified export assets of the corpora-
tion at the close of the taxable year must equal or exceed 95 percent of the
sum of the adjusted basis of all assets.. 4 This "qualified export asset" test
seeks to channel the reinvestment of DISC earnings into export-related
assets. "Qualified export assets" include inventory;55 necessary working
capital; 56 storage, handling, and transportion assets;57 stock or securities
of a related foreign export corporation;58 accounts receivable which arise
from DISC transactions; 59 and producer's loans. 60
(5) The corporation must make an election in order to obtain its
DISC status for the taxable year.61 This election can be made by filing
Form 4876 with the service center with which the corporation would
otherwise file its income tax return. 62 For the election to be valid, the
consent of every person who is a shareholder of the corporation as of the
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(f). For examples of gross and nongross
receipt items, see Treas. Reg. § 1.993-6(a)(2), (b) (1974).
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993 (a) (1) (A). Export property is defined in
section 993(c)(1) as property:
(A) manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in the U.S. by a person
other than a DISC,
(B) held primarily for sale, lease, or rental, in the ordinary course of trade
or business, by or to, a DISC, for direct use, consumption, or disposition
outside the U.S., and
(C) not more than 50% of the fair market value of which is attribut-
able to articles imported into the U.S.
51. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(a)(1)(C). This includes installation and
maintenance services. But see Rev. Rul. 75-322, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 31, at 17
(services performed by a third party under contract with the parent company).
52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(a)(1)(F).
53. Comment, Some Thoughts on DISC, 9 WILLAMETrE L.J. 261, 262 (1973).
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 992(a)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1 (a) (3), (c)
(1974).
55. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 993(b)(1), (c).
56. Id. at § 993(b)(4).
57. Id. at § 993 (b) (2).
58. Id. at § 993(b)(6), (e).
59. Id. at § 993(b)(3).
60. Id. at § 993(b)(5), (d).
61. Id. at § 992(b). Until revocation such election is also valid for the suc-
ceeding taxable years.
62. Proposed Reg. § 1.992-2(a)(1)(i), 140 C.F.R. 27, 484 (June 30, 1975).
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beginning of the first taxable year for which such election is effective must




The profits of a DISC, as such, are exempt from the federal income
tax.65 Instead, the shareholders are taxed to the extent that the DISC in-
come is actually, or deemed to be, distributed to them.66 Generally, half
of the profits will be taxed to the shareholders currently while the tax
on the remaining half will be deferred until the profits are actually dis-
tributed, the shareholder sells his stock, or the corporation loses its DISC
status. 67 This deferral of tax results in cash being currently available for
qualified uses.68
2. Intercompany Pricing
Because of the availability of the income tax deferrment, the process
for the determination of DISC income is a crucial part of the entire DISC
arrangement. In this regard, the statutory intercompany pricing rules of
section 994 of the Internal Revenue Code may be applied to income from
export sales made by a DISC following domestic purchases of the products
from related parties-e.g., its parent company. These rules make it un-
necessary to establish an "arm's length value" on prices charged by re-
lated parties as would otherwise be the case under section 482, the pro-
vision which empowers the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate profits
between related taxpayers if such is necessary to prevent tax avoidance.
Instead, section 994 allows two alternative ("safe haven") methods of allo-
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.992-2(a)(1)(i) (1974).
64. Id. at § 1.992-2(b). Subsequent transferees of DISC stock must also file
consent forms pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.992-2(c) (1974).
65. INT. REv. CoD OF 1954, § 991; Treas. Reg. § 1.991-1(a) (1974).
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 995. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.995-1(b)(1), (2)
(1974). Since a deemed distribution does not reduce the earnings and profits of a
DISC, it does not affect the determination whether a subsequent actual distribu-
tion is a dividend under section 316(a). However, it does affect the determination
whether a subseguent actual distribution is excluded from gross income because
the deemed distribution increases "previously taxed income." Treas. Reg. § 1.995-1
(c)(2) (1974).
67. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 995; Treas. Reg. 1.995-1 (b) (1974). See generally
Brannon, The Revenue Act of 1971-Do Tax Incentives Have New Life?, B.C. IND.
& CoAr. L. REv. 891, 900 (1973); Feinschreiber, How to Aggregate DISC Sales to
Make the Most Effective Use of the Deferral, 86 J. OF TAxATioN 300 (1972).
68. Qualified uses include: effecting "producer's loans," defined by section
993(d) of the Code, (see Treas. Reg. § 1.9934 (1974); J. C~irps, Dorsric INmT-
NATiONAL SA .Es CoRpoAnoNs 26-29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CRIPPS]), financing
export receivables, and investing in qualified obligations. CaPSps at 31-32. Misuse
can result in termination of the DISC status and distribution of all accumulated
retained earnings. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 992(c), 995(b)(2).
[Vol. 41
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cation 9 which are comparatively simple in application 70 and which may
serve to increase the DISC profit figure above that which would result
under section 482.71 In other words, these "special transfer-pricing rules...
allow a substantial part of the parent's manufacturing profits to be at-
tributed to the DISC subsidiary [which in turn is] given preferential treat-
ment."72
3. Producer's Loans
In order to maintain its deferred status, the DISC income must be in-
vested in qualified export assets.7 3 One of the allowable uses to which the
deferred accumulated income may be put is the "producer's loan."7 4 This
use is especially attractive to the parent company, because it may borrow
money from its DISC essentially interest-free. The interest income is not
taxable to the DISC, and although it is ultimately taxed to the share-
holders of the DISC, such expense constitutes a deduction for the parent
borrower.75
For an obligation to qualify as a producer's loan, it must satisfy
the following requirements and limitations of section 993(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code. First, the borrower (either related or unrelated to the
DISC)76 must be engaged in the manufacturing, production, growing, or
extraction of export property in the United States, within the meaning
of section 1.993-3(c) of the Treasury Regulations of 1974.7 7 It is not neces-
sary, however, for the borrower to be exdusively engaged in the export
property trade or business, 78 nor is it necessary to be able to trace the loan
to specific investments in export property.72
The second requirement is that the obligation be evidenced by a
note (or other evidence of indebtedness) with a stated maturity date not
more than five years from the date of the loan.8 0 Thus, a loan which does
not have a stated maturity date, even though it eventually matures within
the five year period, cannot qualify.81 It is also worth noting that section
482 is designed to assure that an arm's length rate of interest is provided
69. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 994(a)(1), (2). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.994-1(c)
(2), (3) (1974). For further discussion and examples of application, see Hyde, The
Domestic International Sales Corporation in Perspective and Operation, 28 Bus.
LAw. 43, 46 (1972-1973).
70. Cupps, supra note 68, at 18.
71. Anninger, supra note 11, at 399; Feinschreiber, supra note 67, at 300-01.
72. Musgrave, International Aspects of United States Tax Policy-Recent
Development and Trends, 1973 CONFERENCE REPORT, CA,ADLXA TAX FOUNDATION
16, 19. For examples of application of these rules, see Treas. Reg. § 1.994 (1974).
73. INT. Rxv. CODE or 1954, § 995(b)(1)(B).
74. Id. at § 993(d). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4 (1974); S. REP. No. 92-437 at
2009-11.
75. Announcement 72-23, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 679, 686-87.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4(a)(2)(iii) (1974).
77. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 993(d)(1)(C).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4(a)(5) (1974).
79. Id.
80. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 993(d)(1)(B).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4(a)(4) (1974).
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for on the loan.82 In addition, the obligation, at the time of creation, must
bear a legend stating, "This Obligation Is Designated A Producer's Loan
Within The Meaning of Section 993(d) of the Internal Revenue Code,"
or words of substantially the same meaning.8 3
The final requirement involves placing limits on the total amount of
producer's loans made by the DISC and the amount of producer's loans
received by the borrower. First, with respect to the lending DISC, the
amount of the loan, when added to the unpaid balance of all other pro-
ducer's loans made by the DISC, cannot exceed the accumulated DISC
income at the beginning of the month in which the loan is made.84 There
is a presumption in favor of the taxpayer that a loan has been made out
of accumulated DISC income if the balance of producer's loans made
during the year does not exceed accumulated DISC income at the end of
the year.85 Second, with respect to the borrower, a loan will be treated as
a producer's loan only to the extent that the amount of the loan, when
added to the unpaid balance of all other producer's loans made by all
DISC's to the same borrower, does not exceed the amount of the borrower's
export-related assets86 multiplied by the ratio of export receipts for the
three preceding taxable years.87 This export-related assets limitation is
supplemented by the increased investment requirement, which states:
A loan to a borrower is a producer's loan only to the extent that
the amount of the loan, when added to the unpaid balance of all
other producer's loans made by all DISC's to the borrower during
the borrower's taxable year, does not exceed the amount of the
borrower's increase for the year in investment in export-related
assets.8 8
The contemplated function of producer's loans is to encourage par-
ent-manufacturers to increase their investment in export-related assets.8 0
It is viewed as the major outlet for the investment of accumulated DISC
income. The significance of the producer's loan as an investment alterna-
tive is particularly apparent where the DISC operates on a commission
basis and does not maintain its own inventory or plant,90 because the
"qualified export asset" test of section 992(a)(1)(B) requires the adjusted
basis of the qualified export assets to equal or exceed 95 percent of the
sum of the adjusted basis of all the assets. 91
82. Id.
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(d)(1)(D); Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4 (a) (iv)
(1974).
84. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(d)(1)(A).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4(a)(3)(ii) (1974).
86. As determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.9934(b)(2) (1974).
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(d)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4(b) (1974.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4(c) (1974); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(d)(3).
89. Richman, Proposed DISC Regulations: Maintaining DISC Status Through
Use of Producer's Loans, 39 J. OF TAXATION 229 (1973).
90. Id.
91. See notes 54-60 and accompanying text supra.
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IV. DoEs DISC VIoATE THE GENERAL AGREEmENT?
A. As a Circumvention of the Technical Language?
In order to determine whether the DISC provisions constitute a
technical violation of the General Agreement it will be necessary to
examine paragraph (4) of Article XVI very closely. If a particular non-
primary product subsidy is such that it invokes the strict prohibitory
language of paragraph (4), a fortiori, the same subsidy is subject to the
more permisive regulations of paragraph (1).92 A similar analysis can be
used in the examination of primary product subsidies under paragraph
(3), but this discussion will concentrate on nonprimary product subsidies
for three reasons. First, "[w]hile there is nothing to prevent primary
product producers from utilizing DISC, they showed little interest in the
provisions during the Congressional hearings." 93 Second, assuming that
there is utilization of DISC by such exporters, the definitional problems
which accompany the "equitable share" element of paragraph (3) render
the impact of the provision's applicability uncertain.9 4 Third, "since almost
all countries subsidize exports of primary products, the incremental dis-
tortion caused by DISC would probably not be viewed very seriously." 9 5
The prohibitory language of paragraph (4), i.e., "shall cease to
grant," applies if two elements coexist. First, the governmental program
must fall within the definition of "export subsidy of a nonprimary prod-
duct." 96 Second, this subsidy must be found to result "in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged
for the like product to buyers in the domestic market."97
1. DISC As an Export Subsidy
The aforementioned "export receipts" test and "export assets" test 9s
stand as the principal DISC qualifying features. These requirements serve
to compel the DISC to engage almost exclusively in export activity. There-
fore, if DISC is a subsidy at all, it must be an export subsidy. Assuming
92. JACKsON, supra note 14, at 397.
93. Anninger, supra note 11, at 400-01 & nA5. A recent Revenue Ruling, how-
ever, may draw the interest of primary product producers. A farmer's cooperative,
exempt from federal income taxation under section 521, may organize a wholly-
owned DISC to handle overseas marketing activities. Rev. Rul. 73-247, 1973-1
Cuxi. BULL. 294. Moreover, it has been ruled that the dividend paid by the DISC
to the cooperative is tax exempt if it is distributed in turn to the patrons of the
cooperative in the form of qualified patronage dividends under sections 1382(b)(1)
and 1388 (a). Rev. Rul. 75-228, 1975 INT. RAv. BULL. No. 24, at 12. But see Tax
Reduction Act of 1975 § 603, 89 Stat. 26, amending § 993 (c) (2) of the Code and
ending DISC benefits as to the sale of energy resources and other scarce materials.
94. Anninger, supra note 11, at 401; DAM, supra note 2, at 142-43; JACKSON,
supra note 14, at 393-96.
95. Anninger, supra note 11, at 401 & n.46; DAA, supra note 2, at 266.
96. See note 20 supra.
97. Id.
98. See notes 48-69 and accompanying text supra.
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then, that the DISC deals with nonprimary products,99 the bare definition
of "subsidy" is the sole issue to be confronted in this part of the analysis.
The General Agreement contains no general definition of the term
•subsidy."1 00 However, paragraph (1) of Article XVI contains the following
descriptive clause concerning that term: ".... which operates directly or in-
directly to increase exports of any product from, or reduce imports of any
product into, its territory. . . ."101 This clause has been interpreted to mean
that even a subsidy which serves only to maintain the status quo by prevent-
ing a decline in exports would be within the scope of Article XVI. 1 °2 This
"in absence of the subsidy" test, coupled with the "directly or indirectly"
language of paragraphs (1) and (4), seems to suggest that the concept of
"subsidy" was intended to be expansive in coverage. 103
As an aid to a clearer understanding of what programs would be con-
sidered an export subsidy within the meaning of the General Agreement,
a GATT Working Party issued a list of eight practices which were deemed
to be Article XVI(4) subsidies.1 04 Of these eight practices, items (c) and
(d)-as well as the Interpretive Note to Article XVI' 0 -have served as
the basis for charges that DISC violates the General Agreement, and as
99. The Interpretive Note to Art. XVI, which defines "primary product," is
also applicable to paragraph (4) and therefore defines, by exclusion, a "nonprimary
product."
100. GATT, 10th Supp. BISD 201, para. 23, at 208 (1962).
101. See note 20 supra.
102. GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 188, 191 (1961).
103. Id. at 200; JACKSON, supra note 14, at 384.
104. The list reads as follows:
(a) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which in-
volve a bonus on exports or re-exports;
(b) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to exporters;
(c) The remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes
or social welfare charges on industrial or commercial enterprises;
(d) The exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or
taxes, other than charges in connection -with importation or indirect taxes
levied at one or several stages on the same goods if sold for internal con-
sumption; or the payment, in respect of exported goods, of amounts
exceeding those effectively levied at one or several stages on these goods
in the form of indirect taxes or of charges in connection with importation
or in both forms;(e) In respect of deliveries by governments or governmental agencies
of imported raw materials for export business on different terms than for
domestic business, the charging of prices below world prices;
(f) In respect of government export credit guarantees, the charging
of premiums at rates which are manifestly inadequate to cover the long-
term operating costs and losses of the credit insurance institutions;
(g) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by
governments) of export credits at rates below those which they have to
pay in order to obtain the funds so employed;
(h) The government bearing all or part of the costs incurred by
exporters in obtaining credit.
GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 185, 186-87 (1961).
105. Id. at 32.
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the basis for a complaint entered by the European Communities and
referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES pursuant to Article XXIII.1 ° 6
'Before examining the language of these items and the Interpretive
Note as they bear upon the DISC legislation, it would be useful to under-
stand the general theory which underlies GATT's approach to tax expend-
iture subsidization.1 07 The Interpretive Note to Article XVI states in part:
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne
by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or
the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess
of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed a subsidy.1 08
The "borne by the like product" phrase has been interpreted to represent
the distinction drawn between direct taxes and indirect taxes.1 09 Accord-
ing to the Note, the exemption or remission of an indirect tax will not
constitute a subsidy if the amount exempted or remitted does not ex-
ceed the amount due or previously collected. However, the Note implies,
and items (c) and (d) of the bad practices list expressly state, that the
exemption or remission of a direct tax does constitute a subsidy.
The reason for this distinction stems from the once generally accepted
economic supposition that indirect taxes are shifted forward and reflected
in the purchase price, while direct taxes are absorbed by the seller and
not so reflected.11 0 Assuming the validity of this premise, an exemption
or remission of a direct tax would then constitute a subsidy in favor of
the seller, whereas the exemption or remission of an indirect tax would
operate in favor of the foreign consumer and not aid the seller.
Contrary to the foregoing theory, however, it now seems apparent that
the exemption or remission of an indirect tax allows the seller to reduce
the price of his product. It has been difficult for many writers to under-
stand why such an opportunity to reduce prices and thus increase sales
106. GATT Doc. L/3851 (1973). There were 23 consultations under Art.
XXIII prior to the initiative of the European Communities on behalf of member
countries which referred the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Mullen,
Export Promotion: Legal and Structural Limitations on a Broad United States
Commitment, 7 LAw & POL. IN'L Bus. 57, 125 Sc n.400 (1975).
107. The term "tax expenditure" has been used to describe those special
provisions of the federal income tax system which represent government
expenditures made through that system to achieve various social and
economic objectives. These special provisions provide deductions, credits,
exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and perferential rates, and serve ends
similar in nature to those served by direct government expenditures or
loan programs.
Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Com-
parison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705, 706 (1970).
108. GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 32 (1961).
109. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 300; DAm, supra note 2, at 139. A direct tax is
that levied upon the income derived from the production and sale of the product
whereas an indirect tax is ordinarily levied on the transfer of the product. An in-
direct tax takes the form of a sales tax or turnover tax. The income tax is the most
common form of direct tax.
110. DAMr, supra note 2, at 214; Hufbauer, The Taxation of Export Profits,
28 NAT. TAx J. 43, 58 (1975).
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does not also constitute subsidization under the General Agreement."'
Although the soundness of either economic theory is beyond the scope
of this comment, it is obvious that the manifestation of the former theory
by GATT's. approval of indirect tax subsidization discriminates against
countries which rely principally on direct taxation systems-e.g., the United
States.1 12 Accordingly, it has been urged that this very inequity was one
of the incentives for the enactment of the DISC legislation. 1 1
Even though the Senate has manifested its dislike for the inconvenience
of having to tread lightly around the wording of an international agree-
ment which has not been submitted for its approval," 4 Congress chose not
to confront directly the General Agreement. Instead, it opted for an
export stimulus which was not expressly prohibited. Consequently, the
question whether the bad practices list covers the DISC situation re-
mains unsolved.
Item (c)'s prohibition on the remission of direct taxes does not seem
to cover the DISC deferral system. A "remission," as the term is commonly
used in the typical border tax adjustment scheme," 65 refers to the forgive-
ness or refund of a tax already assessed or paid.1 16 Of course, it could be
argued that the amount of the deferred tax cannot be determined until the
income tax liability has been assessed, thus rendering the provision appli-
cable.
Item (d) uses the term "exemption" and comes closer to applying to
the DISC situation. The United States has opined that a tax deferral is
not a tax exemption because the tax on the income will eventually be
paid by the DISC stockholders." 7 Authors on the subject, however, have
concluded that the deferral system is an exemption because the deferred
status of the income may be perpetuated indefinitely. L8 In support of this
argument, they have made reference to the Accounting Principles Board's
111. See, e.g., DAM, supra note 2, at 215; Considine, supra note 40, at 251-52;
Hufbauer, supra note 110, at 58.
112. Considine, supra note 40, at 250-51. The acceptance by the United States
of these seemingly non-favorable provisions of the General Agreement has been
attributed to the faith in the strength of the United States economy following
World War II. Accordingly, these discriminatory provisions were viewed as bal-
ancing factors in favor of the economies of war-tom nations. Comment, GATT,
Altered Economics, and DISC: A Legitimate Application of Rebus Sic Stantibus,
5 DENVER J. OF INT'L LAW & POLICY 121, 127 (1975).
113. S. REP. No. 92-437 at 1928.
114. Id.
115. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 295.
116. Anninger, supra note 11, at 403.
117. Id. at 393 & n.12. See also Curzon, Outlook for United States Trade
Policy, 4 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 608, 612 (1970); Schenk, Domestic International
Sales Corporation: A Proposed Stimulant for American Exports, 23 THE TAX
ExEc. 597, 606-07 (1971).
118. Anninger, supra note 11, at 404; Feinschreiber, Electing DISC Benefits,
50 TAxEs 304 (1972); Musgrave, supra note 72, at 20; Naylor, Some Observations
Concerning the Operation of a DISC, 50 TAXES 783, 784 (1972); Seghers, How
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position that the contingent tax liability [related to DISC tax-deferred
income] is so remote that it need not even be considered in the compilation
of annual earnings."19 Moreover, it has been argued that even if the
deferred status is terminated, the earnings attributable thereto would
ordinarily be sufficient to cover the tax liability, thereby resulting in an
exemption. 120
The art of manipulative interpretation and construction need not be
pursued to the extreme in order to reach the conclusion that DISC is an
export subsidy within the meaning of Article XVI(4). The 1960 Working
Party has made it quite dear that the list "should not be considered
exhaustive or . . . limit in any way the generality of the provisions of
paragraph 4 of Article XVI."121 Therefore, notwithstanding the argument
that the foregoing list fails to cover the deferral system, it would be diffi-
cult to support the proposition that such a system does not constitute an
export subsidy under the General Agreement. 122
2. The Price-differential Clause
According to at least one author, the bad practices list "implicitly
recognized" that each of the export subsidies listed satisfied both ele-
ments of Article XVI(4).123 Therefore, each item therein would be con-
sidered a subsidy "which... results in the sale of such product for export
at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product
to buyers in the domestic market."'2 4 However, if items (c) and (d) were
determined not to include DISC as a forbidden practice, then this "price-
differential" test must be confronted and satisfied.
It has been argued that the price-differential clause is not intended to
be an independent requirement for bringing the prohibition into play.125
It is very difficult to gauge the impact which newly-enacted programs such
as DISC have upon the price of imports. Furthermore, "non-price-reducing
export subsidies can also have a trade-distorting effect."'126 Therefore, the
argument goes, the first part of the test is the crucial one, and any subsidy
which falls within it can be presumed to have the prohibited effect without
affirmative proof.
The foregoing line of reasoning is not convincing. Paragraph (1) of
Article VI (Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties), also contains a
"price-differential" clause. It is generally recognized that this clause is
119. Announcement 72-23, 1972-1 Cum. BUL. 679, 681-82.
120. Statement by S. Surrey in Hearings on H.R. 10947 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 729, 733 (1971).
121. GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 185, 187 (1961).
122. JACKsON, supra note 14, at 365-66, 383-84; Hufbauer, supra note 110, at
4647.
123. Anninger, supra note 11, at 407.
124. See note 20 supra.
125. Anninger, supra note 11, at 408-09.
126. Id. at n.80.
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integral to the meaning and application of Article VI.127 It is well settled
that the concepts' contained in Article VI may properly be applied to
Article XVI(4) by analogy as an aid to interpretation of the latter.12 8
Therefore, the significance of Article XVI(4)'s "price-differentiar' clause
should not be overlooked. The difficulty which may accompany the at-
tempt to prove that any given subsidy causes a reduction in the price of
the export should not be determinative whether this part of the test must
be satisfied by the complaining contracting party.
For this reason, an abstract statement which charges that DISC violates
Article XVI(4) is neither properly founded nor very meaningful. Notwith-
standing the initial conclusion 'that DISC was intended to, and does in fact,
operate as an export subsidy within the meaning of paragraph (4), it may
be argued and proven in a given situation that a DISC's tax deferral does
not lead to a reduction in the price of the exported product.129 If this
were indeed true, then the second part of the test would be satisfied and
the restrictions of paragraph (4) should not apply.
If such a conclusion were reached, one must revert to paragraph (1)
of Article XVI in order to allege that DISC violates the General Agree-
ment. This means that evidence must be collected and presented which
indicates that DISC has operated to increase exports or reduce imports.130
At the present time, though, even the Treasury Department has been
unable to record accurately the impact of DISC on export activity.13'
B. As a Frustration of the Objectives of Article XVI?
It is easy, at first glance, to conclude that DISC must certainly frus-
trate the purpose of GATT, even though it may not technically violate
the General Agreement. This conclusion may be drawn by reasoning that
DISC falls within that group of trade barriers which GATT was designed
to eliminate. It can be argued, however, that to the extent that the direct-
indirect tax distinction theory is incorrect, the allowance of indirect tax
exemptions and remissions has a distorting effect on the otherwise normal
pattern of world trade. Following this line of reasoning, DISC can be
viewed as a corrective device designed to counterbalance this inequity,
127. Id. at n.79; JACKsoN, supra note 14, at 414-18.
128. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 397-98.
129. For example, instead of reducing the price of the product, the exporter
may elect to increase export promotion expenditures thereby increasing the demand
for his product. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 16 supra.
131. Mullen, supra note 106, at 82-83 & n.153. Accordingly, the United States
has not recognized DISC as a violation of Art. XVI (1) and therefore has not
complied with the "notification-consultation" requirements thereof. Anninger,
supra note 11, at 409-10. This inability to gauge the effects of DISC stems not
only from the inconvenience of having the data collection tied to the tax return
schedule, but also from the fact that numerous other elements interrelate to
determine the volume of export activity-e.g., wage rates and the availability of
raw materials. Dowd, Is the U.S. Being Priced Out of World Markets?, 25 J. oF
MARKMTNG 1, 1-8 (1960).
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thus actually furthering the purpose of GATT. Until it is possible to
gauge correctly the shifting pattern of direct and indirect taxation, though,
this type of argument lacks a strong foundation.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The fact that DISC may not constitute a violation of Article XVI in
certain instances should not lead to the conclusion that GATT is irrele-
vant to the issue of the desirability of the DISC legislation. It is suggested
that the propriety of keeping the DISC provisions in force should be evalu-
ated by weighing two factors.
The first of these factors concerns the efficiency of DISC in effectuat-
ing the objectives behind its enactment. This matter must be viewed from
two perspectives. It must initially be determined what the benefits expected
of DISC will cost the American taxpayers. A recently published study has
concluded that a balance of payments gain of fifty cents will be recognized
for every dollar of revenue lost through the deferral of the income tax. 3 2
In other words, "[a] ny possible payoff in increased exports is utterly-in-
efficient in terms of revenue loss compared with balance of payments
gains... ,,133 Thus, opponents of the DISC legislation contend that the
tax deferral aids the major companies in the United States at the expense
of the consumers.' 34
Evaluation of the efficiency of DISC must also'entail consideration of
how this system of preferential taxation compares with alternative courses
of remedial action. Only ten days following the passage of the 1971 Rev-
enue Act, the United States entered into the Smithsonian Agreement.135
In this agreement, the United States agreed to devalue the dollar in terms
of gold, while our trading partners agreed to revalue their currencies in
terms of the dollar.130 The intended consequences of this agreement were
that the increased cost of foreign goods would cause a decline in our de-
mand for imports and that the decreased cost of American goods would
increase the foreign demand for our exports. Consequently, the balance of
payments problem is combatted on two fronts by increasing our export
activity while decreasing the flow of imports.' 37 Thus, in terms of cost to
the American taxpayer as compared to revenue lost, it would not seem
132. Brannon, supra note 67, at 899. This study has been recognized and cited
by the following: S. SuPEY, PATHWAYS To TAX REFORM 186 n.24 (1973); Consi-
dine, supra note 40, at 236-45; Musgrave, supra note 72, at 27.
133. S. SURREY, supra note 132, at 186 n.24.
134. Id. at 186. See also B. BITER & J. EusT-_c, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CoRrORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ff 17.14 (Cum. Supp. No. 2, 1975); Rich-
man, supra note 89, at 229 n.l.
135. INTERNATIONAL MONENTARY FUND RELEASE No. 862 (Dec. 19, 1971). Text
of the IMF communique was reprinted in the New York Times, Dec. 20, 1971, at
56, col. 2.
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logical in an 'era of floating exchange rates to also engage the assistance of
preferential taxation.13 8
The second factor to be examined with regard to the propriety of
DISC has to do with GATT in general. A subsidy need not violate the
General Agreement in fact in order to elicit a response from other con-
tracting parties. Contracting parties who perceive themselves as "victims"
of DISC may avail themselves of certain retaliatory measures provided
in the General Agreement.139 These include the imposition of counter-
vailing duties140 and the suspension, withdrawal, or modification of a
GATT concession or obligation.14' DISC, therefore, may initiate a "chain
reaction"1 42 which would result in the erection of a myriad of defensive
trade barriers. Aside from undermining the purpose of GATT, 4 3 these re-
taliatory acts by other nations would also operate to defeat the purpose
for which DISC was designed. 144
Therefore, consideration of the inefficiency of DISC as an incen-
tive to increase exports and the likelihood that it will incite a "compet-
itive subsidization race"' 4 5 would seem to compel the conclusion that the
DISC legislation, should be repealed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The DISC legislation represents an attempt to increase United States
export activity in order to remedy the country's balance of payments
deficit. It has been argued that the DISC legislation should be repealed
because it violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This
comment has shown that there is at least some merit to this argument.
Whether or'not DISC violates the General Agreement, however, there are
other practical reasons for its elimination. The cost of the program in
terms of tax revenue lost compared to export revenue gained, and the
possibility of provoking affected contracting parties into adopting coun-
terbalancing economic measures are two of the primary reasons. The
threat that such; an inefficient subsidy could engender such adverse re-
actions should strike the balance against the continuation of this deferral
system.
DAVID F. SULLIVAN
138. Hufbauer, supra note 110, at 57.
139. DAm, supra note 2, at 136; JACKSON, supra note 14, at 377.
140. Article VI(3), (6)(a).
141. Article XIX(1), XXIII(2); JACKSON, supra note 14, at 377-78.
142. Anninger, supra note 11, at 420 8= n.132.
143. DA, supra note 2, at 136.
144. Musgrve, supra note 72, at 28.
145. DAm, supra note 2, at 136.
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